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CIVIL FORFEITURE AND DRUG PROCEEDS:
THE NEED TO BALANCE SOCIETAL INTERESTS
WITH THE RIGHTS OF INNOCENT OWNERS
I. INTRODUCHION
The drug problem in the United States has reached such epidemic
proportions that nearly every segment of society has been affected in
some way.' Our nation's leaders have acknowledged the problem and
its detrimental effects, 2 but have been unable to design and implement a
plan to eliminate this evil. In a special address to the American people,3
then President George Bush unveiled his plan to rid the United States of
what he called "the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today."4
The President's plan included a number of elements designed to fight the
"war on drugs." Underlying these elements was a common theme of
"zero tolerance for casual drug use."5
The "zero tolerance" policy extended the Reagan Administration's
"war on drugs," which had led to the reinterpretation and broad imple-
mentation of the civil forfeiture statute found in the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.6 Under this statute,
law enforcement officials could seize property used in the processing or
distribution of controlled substances or property purchased with the pro-
ceeds of such activities.
1. In 1990, the estimated number of illicit drug users in the United States was 26,809,000,
which accounted for approximately 13.3 percent of the total population. NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE POPULATION ESTIMATES 1990,
17 (1991). "Illicit drugs," as used in the survey, include "marijuana, nonmedical use of psycho-
therapeutics, inhalants, cocaine, hallucinogens and heroin." Id.
2. In a special address, President George Bush spoke passionately of this menace as he
acknowledged:
No one among us is out of harm's way. When 4-year-olds play in playgrounds strewn
with discarded hypodermic needles and crack vials, it breaks my heart. When cocaine,
one of the most deadly and addictive illegal drugs, is available to school kids-school
kids-it's an outrage. And when hundreds of thousands of babies are born each year
to mothers who use drugs-premature babies born desperately sick-then even the
most defenseless among us are at risk.
Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY CoNW. PRES. Doc.
1305 (Sept. 5, 1989).
3. Id at 1304.
4. Id.
5. Id at 1306; see id at 1305-08.
6. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511,84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1988)).
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The drafters of the civil forfeiture statute realized the potential for
harm to innocent owners whose property was used in such illegal activi-
ties without their knowledge. This foresight led to the adoption of inno-
cent owner defenses designed to protect individuals and institutions who
stood to have their property seized without misconduct on their part.
One example of a protected group is common carriers who cannot be
reasonably expected to police their passengers and cargo. Another ex-
ample of protected individuals is those people whose property has been
stolen or misappropriated. Without such a defense, these individuals
would be victimized twice-first by the thieves and a second time by the
government when their property is forfeited. A final example is land-
lords who rent to tenants who subsequently use the premises to conduct
illegal activity. If such a defense were not available, our nation's land-
lords would be wary of every potential tenant. These examples are only
a few instances of the many situations in which innocent parties could
stand to lose their property because of another party's wrongdoing. In
each of these cases, it seems obvious that innocent parties should not
have their property confiscated.
There are situations in which it is more difficult to determine if the
property owner should be extended the innocent owner defense. These
situations have presented a challenge to Congress and the courts as both
have tried to determine which parties should be extended the defense
and which parties should be deprived of it. Congress and the courts have
tried to balance the equities and interests of the concerned parties, but
have been unable to devise a scheme that effectively addresses both
sides. On one side of the equation exists the compelling interests of soci-
ety in dealing effectively with the drug problem, while on the other side
exists the interests of the individual who might be deprived of his or her
property. Finding a solution will require a scheme that is flexible enough
to accommodate the needs of innocent parties while still maintaining
enough rigidity to effectively deal with the drug problem.
This Comment will examine the civil forfeiture statute as it applies to
innocent donees who gain possession of tainted property after an illegal
act has taken place.7 The discussion will begin by examining the history
of civil forfeiture and will trace the Supreme Court's treatment of inno-
7. This formulation of the main issue is somewhat different from the question presented
in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), which asks "whether an
owner's lack of knowledge of the fact that her home had been purchased with the proceeds of
illegal drug transactions constitutes a defense to a forfeiture proceeding under The Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970." Id. at 1129 (citation omitted). The
Court's question is somewhat more narrow, but the overall inquiries will follow parallel paths.
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cent owners to show the lack of recognition of innocence on the owner's
part as a defense. The next section will examine the evolution of the
current statutory scheme and will examine innocent owners within the
general framework of that scheme.
After this background information has been presented, the focus of
the Comment will shift to the case of United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Avenue.8 This case presented the United States Supreme Court with the
issue of when "innocent" donees of tainted drug proceeds can assert the
innocent owner defense. In deciding Buena Vista, the Court was faced
with a number of sub-issues. The first sub-issue was who qualifies as an
"owner." The second sub-issue concerned the role of the relation-back
doctrine in civil forfeiture. The final sub-issue in Buena Vista was to re-
solve the difficulty involved in applying two of the statutory scheme's
provisions simultaneously. This Comment will examine the plurality
opinion's treatment of these issues. The Comment will conclude with a
number of suggestions for changes that could solve these problems.
These suggestions will attempt to balance the compelling interests in-
volved in maintaining the effectiveness of the statutory scheme while
protecting innocent owners' property from seizure.
II. THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE MODERN CIVIL
FORFEITURE STATUTES
A. England and the Common Law
The historical antecedents of civil forfeiture can be traced to biblical
times. 9 The "deodand" was part of the English common law10 and pro-
8. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
9. The idea of forfeiture of the object as punishment for the object's "conduct" can be
found in the Holy Bible where it is written that "[w]hen an ox gores a man or a woman to
death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be
clear." Exodus 21:28.
10. The precise origins of the deodand are somewhat uncertain. One author commented
in frustration, "[W]e cannot hope successfully to penetrate the obscurity in which it is in-
volved, or to suggest any theory which may be altogether satisfactory to the learned and in-
quiring reader." Law of Deodands, 34 LAW MAG. 188, 191 (1845). Other commentators of
the period adopted a more positive attitude toward explaining the origins of the elusive doc-
trine. One such commentator was Sir Matthew Hale who wrote:
Anciently, it seems, when any person came suddenly by his death by the accidental
agency of an animate or inanimate chattel, the chattel was to be given to the church for
masses for the soul of the deceased. Such a law was manifestly a wise and humane one,
while it was the fervent belief of the people that saying of such masses was essential to
the eternal welfare of the souls of deceased persons; for in all times, persons of the
poorer sort are those who are most exposed to death by accidents, and this would be
particularly the case in the times of which we speak, when the higher classes of society
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vided for the seizure of property that was found to have caused the
death of any of the king's subjects. Sir Matthew Hale explained the con-
cept: "By deodand, is meant whatever personal chattel is the immediate
occasion of the death of any reasonable creature; which is forfeited to
the king to be applied to pious uses, and distrusted in alms by his high
almoner: though formerly destined to a more religious purpose."'1 An-
other commentator of the time explained the deodand in more acciden-
tal terms:
A deodand ... must arise from a death by misadventure, and is,
when any moveable thing not fixed to the freehold, or instrument
inanimate or beast animate, doth, upon land or in fresh water, by
mischance cause the untimely death of man above the age of
fourteen years, within the year and day.' 2
Such an explanation begins to capture the prevailing attitude of the pe-
riod, which was that the objects truly were the wrongdoers and, as such,
the objects should be punished. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed
that at this time "the fact of motion is adverted to as of much impor-
tance."' 3 This observation further emphasizes that it was truly the prop-
erty that was being prosecuted and punished in the forfeiture
proceedings because inanimate objects were held culpable when they be-
came animated.
To fully understand the history of civil forfeiture provisions, a
number of important distinctions must be realized with respect to deo-
dands and other forms of forfeiture statues. One of the most basic and
critical distinctions is that in the case of deodands, the res, or property,
was considered to be the offender and, therefore, subject to forfeiture.
The deodand was a doctrine used in accidents where no human factor
influenced the fatal events. The same theory of culpable property has
been applied as the basis underlying the present civil forfeiture statutes
because the actions are commenced against the property and are not
affected by the outcome of any potential pending criminal actions.
took care, by their continual state of warfare and mutual destruction, to allow little
room for accidental death among themselves, so that but for the law which devoted to
the procurement of masses the thing that caused accidental death, there could have
been for the poor no provision for that species of spiritual aid, which was considered,
both by rich and poor, as much an essential as decent burial is at this day.
SiR MATrHew HALE, HIsroRIA PLACITORtIM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAs OF THE
CRowN 423-24 n.1 (1847).
11. HALE, supra note 10, at 423 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
12. Law of Deodands, supra note 10, at 189.
13. OUVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 24 (1881)(emphasis omitted).
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In contrast to civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture statutes were imple-
mented with the intent to punish the offenders and not the property. For
example, a gun used in a murder would be forfeited, but it would not be
considered a deodand even though it would be found to have caused the
death of another. There is ample authority from 19th century England
which establishes that deodands would not be found in cases of murder
or manslaughter. 4 Forfeiture was also used as punishment for felonies
other than murder, such as treason.' 5 William Blackstone explained the
rationale behind the forfeiture of the property of these criminals:
[A]ll property is derived from society, being one of those civil
rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that
degree of natural freedom which every man must sacrifice when
he enters into social communities. If therefore a member of any
national community violates the fundamental contract of his asso-
ciation, by transgressing the municipal law, he forfeits his right to
such privileges as he claims by that contract; and the state may
very justly resume that portion of property, or any part of it,
which the laws have before assigned him.' 6
Blackstone's comments establish that the purpose of seizing the offend-
ers' property was to punish them and make them literally pay for violat-
ing society's rules. His explanation also illustrates the inherent policy
differences between the seizure of property as part of an individual's
punishment for a crime and the forfeiture of property because the prop-
erty was considered culpable. This distinction may seem somewhat arti-
ficial and insignificant, but its impact on the formulation of future
forfeiture statutes cannot be over-emphasized. This distinction between
criminal and civil forfeiture is critical to this Comment because only the
latter will be discussed.
B. Civil Forfeiture in the United States
The deodand was never adopted as part of the common law in the
United States.' 7 However, this did not mean that forfeitures of property
14. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CommE NARIs *299; HALE, supra note 10, at 424; 1
SIR FREDERICK PoLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351
(2nd ed. 1898).
15. See 1 WiLLiAm S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67-73 (1922).
16. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *299.
17. The deodand was not only never adopted in this country, but it was expressly rejected
in Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54 (Tenn. 1916). The Supreme Court of Tennessee
stated:
In this state, we have a positive denunciation of its principle firmly embedded in the
fundamental law. The Constitution of 1870 provides:
1 860 [Vol. 77:856
CIVIL FORFEITURE AND DRUG PROCEEDS
were not undertaken in this country. Many offenses resulted in seizure
of the offending property, both before and after the ratification of the
Constitution. During the colonial period, English forfeiture provisions
were enforced in this country as common law courts exercised in rem
jurisdiction over various property. Many forfeiture statutes were also
adopted shortly after the ratification of the Constitution. One such stat-
ute provided for the seizure of property involved in customs offenses.'8
Another federal statute authorized the seizure of vessels used to deliver
slaves to foreign countries.19 Yet another statute provided for the
seizure of any vessel used to deliver slaves to this country.20 These ex-
amples are but a few of the many statutes that mandated seizure of prop-
erty if that property was found to have been implemented as part of an
illegal act. "The enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; con-
temporary federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of
property that might be used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise."2 '
C. The Innocent Owner's Defense
The disposition of the innocent owner's property has been debated
since the inception of these statutes. It seems fair and logical to assume
that the property of innocent individuals falls outside the statutory provi-
sions authorizing such seizures. This assumption was not reflected in the
statutory scheme or judicial decisions until recently, however. In its 1974
opinion of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,' the Supreme
Court summarized the general attitude toward any type of innocent
owner defense: "Despite this proliferation of forfeiture enactments, the
innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uni-
formly been rejected as a defense."23
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases to present the innocent
owner issue was United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee,24 in which the gov-
No corruption of blood or forfeiture of estates: no deodands.-That no convic-
tion shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. The estate of such persons
as shall destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in the case of natural death.
If any person be killed by casualty, there shall be no forfeiture in consequence
thereof. Article 1, § 12.
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
18. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29 (1789).
19. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 347 (1794).
20. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, § 4, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
21. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
22. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
23. Id. at 683.
24. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814).
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ernment seized a quantity of coffee under the Non-Intercourse Act of
1809.25 This Act prohibited the importation of coffee and authorized its
seizure. The seizure occurred after the coffee was sold to a bona fide
purchaser for value who brought the action to regain title.26 The Court
upheld the forfeiture by interpreting the statute to vest title in the
United States government upon commission of the offense.' The Court
acknowledged the harsh results of its opinion, but justified them as
follows:
It is true that cases of hardship and even absurdity may be
supposed to grow out of this decision; but on the other hand, if by
a sale it is put in the power of an offender to purge a forfeiture, a
state of things not less absurd will certainly result from it.28
Even at this early date, the Court had a firm understanding and appreci-
ation of the difficulty involved in balancing the rights of innocent owners
against the need for effective governmental policy.
The Court was presented with the same issue a short time later in
The Palmyra.9 In this case, a vessel allegedly involved in piratical activi-
ties was seized in accordance with the Piracy Acts of 1819.30 In its deci-
sion, the Court reiterated the importance of the distinction between
criminal proceedings, which included forfeiture as part of the punish-
ment, and statutorily prescribed in rem proceedings in which the res, or
property, was the offender.31 The Court stated that "no personal convic-
tion of the offender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture in rem in cases of
this nature."3  By reiterating the separation of the in rem proceeding
from any criminal prosecution, the Court affirmed that the innocence of
a party had no bearing on the right of the government to seize the prop-
erty.33 If there was a connection between the proceedings, the govern-
25. Ch. 24, § 5, 2 Stat. 528 (1809).
26. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 399.
27. Id. at 405.
28. Id.
29. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
30. Ch. 77, § 2, 3 Stat. 510 (1819).
31. Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15.
32. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
33. The Court was careful to keep the distinction and preserve the in rem proceeding as a
separate entity as it declared:
In the contemplation of the common law the offender's right was not devested until the
conviction. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures created by
statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the exchequer. The thing is here
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the
thing;... [T]he practice has been, and so this court understand the law to be, that the
proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal pro-
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ment would have to wait for a criminal conviction before acting on the
property. Such a delay would defeat the purpose of proceeding against
the property in rem because this procedure is intended to allow the gov-
ernment to move swiftly.
Another case applied the same statute and forfeiture provisions
about twenty years after The Palmyra. In United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel,34 an innocent owner's vessel was seized after it was found to be
armed. The Court acknowledged that the owner's innocence had been
"fully established, 36 but asserted that the innocence could have no bear-
ing on the seizure. In his majority opinion, Justice Story declared:
[1]t may be remarked that the act makes no exception whatso-
ever, whether the aggression be with or without the co-operation
of the owners. The vessel which commits the aggression is treated
as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the for-
feiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the charac-
ter or conduct of the owner ....
And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only
adequate means of suppressing the offense or wrong, or insuring
an indemnity to the injured party.37
The cases interpreting this statute 38 illustrate the Court's unwavering re-
solve to bring congressional intent to fruition. While the Court acknowl-
edged that innocent individuals may lose their property as a result of the
civil forfeiture statute, it firmly established that innocent owner protec-
tion was not their highest priority.
ceeding in personam. This doctrine is deduced from a fair interpretation of the legisla-
tive intention apparent upon its enactments.
Id. at 14-15.
34. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
35. Id at 211-12.
36. Id. at 238.
37. Id. at 233.
38. It is important to note that the cases mentioned represent only a small cross-section of
the many that dealt with innocent owners under the Piracy Act of 1819. Chief Justice Mar-
shall seemed to summarize the court's position as he dealt with a similar statute in United
States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612):
It is true, that inanimate matter can commit no offence. The mere wood, iron, and sails
of the ship, cannot, of themselves, violate the law. But this body is animated and put in
action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The vessel acts and speaks by the
master. She reports herself by the master. It is, therefore, not unreasonable that the
vessel should be affected by this report.
Id. at 982. Chief Justice Marshall's comments plunge through the legal fiction of an inanimate
object committing the offense and offer a more realistic, if not pleasing, explanation to those
innocent individuals who have had their property confiscated.
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Another area that Congress deemed appropriate for civil forfeiture
was revenue law violations. This area seemed to be a natural for forfei-
ture because the target of these activities was profit, and the seizure of
property would serve to deter would-be wrongdoers from engaging in
such activities. One of the first civil forfeiture cases involving a revenue
statute39 was Dobbins's Distillery v. United States.40 This case involved a
landowner who leased his property to a group of individuals that used it
as a distillery.4 ' Dobbins's arose over thirty years after Brig Malek Ad-
hel, but the Court still spoke with the same certainty when it held that
the innocent owner could not assert his innocence as a defense to the
forfeiture.42 The Court declared that the lessee who engaged in the ille-
gal activity had the power to bind the property:
Power to that effect the Law vests in him by virtue of his lease;
and, if he abuses his trust, it is a matter to be settled between him
and his lessor; but the acts of violation as to the penal conse-
quences to the property are to be considered just the same as if
they were the acts of the owner.43
This passage offers an excellent illustration of the Court's continuing
harsh attitude toward these offenses. It further illustrates the Court's
determination to carry out congressional intent by rejecting an innocent
owner defense where one had not been statutorily prescribed. This case
also shows that the legal fiction of treating the property as the offender
served purposes beyond merely "punishing" the culpable property. It
also served to deter landowners from knowingly allowing their property
to be used for illegal purposes and then pleading ignorance when the
lessee is caught. If landlords were allowed to assert their innocence and
escape forfeiture, then the effectiveness of the statute would be drasti-
cally reduced.'
39. Act of March 31, 1868, ch. 41, § 5, 15 Stat. 58 (1868).
40. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
41. Id. at 396-97.
42. Id. at 403-04.
43. Id. at 404.
44. For an additional case dealing with forfeiture of innocent owner property under the
revenue laws, see United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890). In that case, the Court rejected
construing the statutes in favor of the defendant as would be done under penal statutes. The
Court explained:
[S]tatutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public
good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or
forfeitures, not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the de-
fendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the inten-
tion of the legislature.
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Another early case that involved an innocent owner is J.W. Gold-
smith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States.45 In this case, the Court upheld the
seizure of an automobile under a federal tax-fraud forfeiture statute.46
The Court held that the statute did not deprive the innocent owner of his
property in violation of the Due Process Clause.47 However, it acknowl-
edged the arguments that such a seizure could be unjust and beyond the
scope of congressional intent:
It is, hence, plausibly urged that such could not have been the
intention of Congress, that Congress necessarily had in mind the
facts and practices of the world and that, in the conveniences of
business and of life, property is often and sometimes necessarily
put into the possession of another than its owner. And it follows,
is the contention, that Congress only intended to condemn the
interest the possessor of the property might have to punish his
guilt, and not to forfeit the title of the owner who was without
guilt.48
After acknowledging that Congress probably had not intended to seize
the innocent owner's property, the Court reiterated that the property
was culpable.49 This culpability was based on the theory that in the case
of property used to accomplish certain wrongs, "Congress interposes the
care and responsibility of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the
law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property a certain
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong."'5 0 The rejec-
tion of Due Process arguments in this case emphasized the continued
reliance on statutory construction and congressional intent as the deter-
mining factors in the Court's decisions about innocent owners.
Prohibition brought with it a number of state forfeiture statutes. One
such statute5l was at issue in Van Oster v. Kansas.51 In this case, an auto-
Id. at 12. The Court's express rejection of construing the forfeiture statute as penal further
emphasizes the nature of the proceedings as against the culpable property and not as against
the property owners. The issue of whether the forfeiture proceedings should afford the same
constitutional safeguards to the property-defendant as to the person-defendant still remains
unresolved.
45. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
46. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98 (1866).
47. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
48. Id. at 510.
49. Id. at 510-11.
50. Id. at 510.
51. Act of March 15, 1919, ch. 217, §§ 1-5, 1919 Kan. Sess. Laws 294-96 (intoxicating
liquors).
52. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
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mobile was seized after it was illegally used to transport liquor. 3 The
Court rejected arguments that the car's owner was without knowledge of
the intended use of the vehicle and that he would not have consented
had he known of its intended use.54 The Court found it sufficient that
the owner had entrusted it to the offender. In so finding, the Court com-
pared forfeiture to other areas of law:
Much of the jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of the statute and
common law of liens as enables a mere bailee to subject the
bailed property to a lien, the power of a vendor of chattels in
possession to sell and convey good title to a stranger, are familiar
examples.55
By analogizing to these other well-settled areas of law and by upholding
the forfeiture against a Fourteenth Amendment attack,56 the Court so-
lidified the notion that the innocence of the property owners would have
no bearing on forfeitures.
After Van Oster, the Supreme Court was not again directly con-
fronted with the innocent owner issue until the case of Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 57 This case involved a leased pleasure yacht
seized in accordance with a Puerto Rican statute.5 8 The statute author-
ized the seizure of property used to transport controlled substances. The
lessors attempted to intervene as innocent owners.59 The Court upheld
the forfeiture action but indicated that innocent owners might warrant
some protection. It stated, in dictum, that "it would be difficult to reject
the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfei-
ture had been taken from him without his privity or consent. ' 60 The
acknowledgment that innocent owners might be protected in certain lim-
ited situations marked a major turning point in forfeiture law as the
Court began to re-evaluate a doctrine that had existed since the days of
the deodand.6' The Court did not establish a limited innocent owner
exception, but only stated:
Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not
only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activ-
ity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be ex-
53. Id. at 465-66.
54. Id. at 467.
55. Id. at 467.
56. Id. at 468-69.
57. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
58. Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, tit. 24, § 2512, 1971 P.R. Laws 432.
59. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 668.
60. Id. at 689 (footnotes omitted).
61. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
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pected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that
circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture
served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. 62
Calero-Toledo's significance cannot be over-emphasized, however. The
Court seemed to be wavering in its resolve to adhere to congressional
intent as being above all other factors in making its decisions. The
Court's language in Calero-Toledo contains some reluctance, failing to
enunciate definitive statements or exceptions.
This line of cases illustrates the Court's reluctance to find a constitu-
tionally mandated innocent owner defense in cases in which Congress
has failed to legislate such a defense.63 The Court relied almost exclu-
sively on congressional intent, which was designed to provide a disincen-
tive to potential wrongdoers and to punish those individuals who
undertook the illegal activities by holding their property responsible as
an accomplice. Finally, the Court's decision in Calero-Toledo signaled a
change in attitude that Congress was quick to address when it amended
the statutory scheme.
III. THE CuRRENT STATUTORY SCHEME
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
197061 was enacted "to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing
menace of drug abuse in the United States. 65 The Act was intended to
address the many facets of the drug problem as evidenced by its state-
ment of purpose:
"To amend the Public Health Service Act and other laws to pro-
vide increased research into, and prevention of, drug abuse and
drug dependence; to provide for treatment and rehabilitation of
drug abusers and drug dependent persons; and to strengthen ex-
isting law enforcement authority in the field of drug abuse."66
62. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
63. See also Logan v. United States, 260 F. 746 (5th Cir. 1919); United States v. One
Saxon Automobile, 257 F. 251 (4th Cir. 1919); United States v. Mincey, 254 F. 287 (5th Cir.
1918); United States v. 246 1/2 Pounds of Tobacco, 103 F. 791 (N.D. Wash. 1900).
64. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
65. H. R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,4567. This initial scheme had a number of intended goals to deal with the
drug problem:
(1) through providing authority for increased efforts in drug abuse prevention and re-
habilitation of users, (2) through providing more effective means for law enforcement
aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by providing for an overall bal-
anced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs.
Id.
66. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1236 (1970).
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One of the Act's main tools to confront the drug problem was authoriza-
tion to law enforcement to seize property used in any aspect of the drug
trade.67 Forfeiture seemed to be the perfect way to combat the prolifer-
ation of illegal drugs because it provided a way to reach the driving force
behind the drug industry.' Other criminal penalties, such as imprison-
ment and fines, appeared futile in comparison to forfeiture. The logic
was simple; if the ability to make profits could be removed or seriously
curtailed, there would be less incentive to traffic in illegal drugs. The
chances for success under these new forfeiture provisions seemed great;
however, the results painted a dismal picture. After it became apparent
that the scheme had failed to achieve its intended purposes, Congress
decided to make certain additions to the statute.
In 1978, Congress undertook a seemingly elementary step to render
the statute more effective. It added a provision (section 881) authorizing
the seizure of proceeds from these illegal activities in addition to seizure
of property.69 This additional provision was designed to eliminate profit
as a motivating factor in the drug trade. The addition of this section was
67. The original statute was limited in the areas of property that were subject to forfei-
ture. Only the following property was within the reach of the statute:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or in-
tended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subehapter.
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988)).
68. The intended goal of removing the economic rewards from the drug industry is clear,
as evidenced by the comments of Senator Joseph R. Biden regarding the implementation of
the original forfeiture scheme:
Since 1970, the Federal Government has had the statutory authority to punish a
convicted criminal for distributing drugs illegally not only by incarceration but also by
forfeiture; that is, the surrender of assets generated by illicit trading in drugs to the
Government by court order. It was hoped that taking away the enormous sums of
money involved would eliminate the drug network by not only seizing illicit drugs and
incarcerating traffickers but also by confiscating the enormous profits that sustain the
elaborate trafficking networks.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMMIrTE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNrIED STATES SEN-
ATE, FORFEITURE OF NARCOTICS PROCEEDS 2 (1981).
69. The subsection provided:
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significant because it included an innocent owner provision that pro-
tected owners whose property had been used without their "knowledge
or consent."70
This second attempt at implementing a forfeiture scheme led to simi-
larly disappointing results.7' Congress recognized the ineffectiveness of
the amended statute and further modified the scheme in 1984. The for-
feiture statutes were deficient in multiple areas; however, two areas
presented the most serious problems and were given priority in the sub-
sequent amendment process.
The first deficiency was the limited scope of the property subject to
forfeiture7 2 Real property was not subject to forfeiture. Without seiz-
ing the real property on which these operations were run, the govern-
ment allowed drug traffickers to retain a key economic possession in
addition to an essential part of their enterprise.73
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and
all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facili-
tate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowl-
edge or consent of that owner.
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95-633,
§ 301(a)(1), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (1978) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
70. 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) (1988).
71. The government recognized that forfeiture had not lived up to its great expectations
and goals as illustrated by the following comments:
In April 1981 the General Accounting Office released a report entitled Asset Forfei-
ture-A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking .... The GAO concluded
that the [two] major reasons for the failure of forfeiture Statutes-which in 1970 were
proclaimed to be the ideal weapon for breaking the backs of sophisticated narcotics
operations-were (1) that Federal law enforcement agencies had not aggressively pur-
sued forfeiture, and (2) that the current forfeiture statutes contain numerous limita-
tions and ambiguities that have significantly impeded the full realization of forfeiture's
potential as a powerful law enforcement weapon.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374
[hereinafter S. RaP. No. 225]. These comments are an excellent illustration of the general
confidence in forfeiture as an effective weapon. The comments also illustrate the recognition
that the statutory scheme needed to be revised if it was to be effective.
72. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 71, at 194-95, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3377-
78.
73. The inconsistency of the statute in the lack of such a provision was recognized in the
Senate Report, which stated:
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The other major deficiency in the statutory scheme was the "phe-
nomenon of defendants defeating forfeiture by removing, transferring,
or concealing their assets prior to conviction."'74 Any delay in the forfei-
ture proceeding could give offending individuals time to dispose of their
assets and defeat forfeiture. A Senate report evidenced a clear recogni-
tion of this problem by stating, "Changes are necessary both to preserve
the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal forfeiture, and, in
those cases in which he does transfer, deplete, or conceal his property, to
assure that he cannot as a result avoid the economic impact of forfei-
ture. '75 Thus, congressional intent was clearly directed to devise a statu-
tory scheme devoid of loopholes, which offered an opportunity to avoid
forfeiture penalties.
When Congress began to rectify the problems that had prevented the
full implementation and effectiveness of the forfeiture provisions, it de-
vised amendments "intended to eliminate the statutory limitations and
ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal
law enforcement agencies. 76 There were a number of changes and addi-
tions to the statutory scheme; however, two changes proved to be the
most useful because they directly confronted the weaknesses discussed
above.
The first change was a provision enabling authorities to seize any real
property used to facilitate drug-related activities,77 a strong addition to
Under current law, if a person uses a boat or car to transport narcotics or uses equip-
ment to manufacture dangerous drugs, his use of the property renders it subject to civil
forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house
as a manufacturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision to subject his
real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was indispensable to the commis-
sion of a major drug offense and the prospect of the forfeiture of the property would
have been a powerful deterrent.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 71, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378 (footnote
omitted).
74. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 71, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378.
Although the focus of this Comment is the civil forfeiture aspects of the statute, this deficiency
and subsequent remedial provisions are extremely significant as they had great implications
for civil forfeiture.
75. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 71, at 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3379.
76. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 71, at 192, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3375.
77. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306, 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (1984) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1988)). The section provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest ... which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment,
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the government's arsenal. This provision was a powerful deterrent to
illegal activities because the statutory scheme now included all of the
drug trafficker's property within the scope of forfeiture. This subsection
also included an innocent owner provision that protected owners in situ-
ations in which the activities undertaken were done "without the knowl-
edge or consent" of the owner.7'
The second important addition to the statutory scheme was a provi-
sion that codified the common law relation-back theory79 that first ap-
peared in United States v. Stowell.s0 This provision was originally
enacted to mirror the criminal forfeiture statute that was designed to
prevent criminals from concealing assets prior to trial.
After the 1984 amendments, the forfeiture scheme of section 881 was
basically complete, and it was enforced extensively to combat the drug
problem in the United States. Some subsequent changes were made, but
they were primarily administrative in nature and were not of great con-
sequence to the statute's implementation. As the statute was imple-
mented on a broader scale, however, inherent problems began to
surface.
IV. Tim BUENA VISTA CASE
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court had rejected the inno-
cent owner defense in civil forfeiture by deferring to congressional in-
tent.81 This Comment also has shown that Congress recognized the need
to protect innocent owners while still maintaining the effectiveness of the
statutory scheme.' United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue 3 was the
first case to question the extent to which innocent donees would be pro-
tected under federal forfeiture statutes containing innocent owner
provisions.
except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(f), 98 Stat. 1837, 2051 (1984) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(h) (1988)). The statutory provision enacted was merely a reiteration of the long-estab-
lished common law doctrine as it provided that "[a]ll right, title, and interest in property de-
scribed in subsection (a) shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise
to forfeiture under this section." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
80. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
81. See supra notes 22-63 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
83. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
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The facts of Buena Vista are as follows: Joseph Anthony Brenna and
Beth Ann Goodwin lived together in a close personal relationship from
the late 1970s until 1987. 4 In November 1982, Mr. Brenna transferred
$216,000 by wire to Ms. Goodwin's attorneys in New Jersey. 5 Ms.
Goodwin then used the money to purchase the property at 92 Buena
Vista Avenue, Rumson, New Jersey, where she had lived since 1982.6
The government seized this property in 1989 with a forfeiture action
under 21 U.S.C. § 88187 after Mr. Brenna was indicted on a number of
offenses related to the importation of marijuana.88 The complaint seek-
ing forfeiture was ified on April 3, 1989, and shortly thereafter, "the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the
verified complaint and determined that there was probable cause to be-
lieve that the premises were subject to forfeiture."8 9 A Summons and
Warrant for Arrest were issued and the United States Marshall seized
the property.90
Ms. Goodwin moved for dismissal, but the district court denied the
motion and granted the "government's request for a stay of [the] civil
proceeding pending trial of the criminal proceeding in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida." 91 The district court refused to allow Ms. Goodwin to
assert the innocent owner defense of section 881(a)(6) after she admitted
that the funds she used to purchase the house were a gift from Mr.
Brenna. 2 The court stated, "[T]he innocent owner defense may only be
invoked by those who can demonstrate that they are bona fide purchas-
ers for value."93
84. 937 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The indictment alleged that Brenna and a number of other individuals:
[E]ngaged in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, engaged
in a conspiracy to import more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana into the United
States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, and knowingly imported in excess of 1,000 kilo-
grams of marijuana into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), and 18
U.S.C. § 2.
Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Ms. Goodwin was allowed to remain in possession of the property in accordance
with an Occupancy/Tenant Agreement with the United States Marshals Service. Id.
91. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 863 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
92. Id. at 860.
93. Id.
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On July 13, 1990, the district court issued an order certifying four
questions for appeal.94 The central question was "[w]hether an innocent
owner defense may be asserted by a person who is not a bona fide pur-
chaser for value concerning a parcel of land where the government has
established probable cause to believe that the parcel of land was
purchased with monies traceable to drug proceeds." 95 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the district court's con-
tention that Ms. Goodwin must be a bona fide purchaser for value to
assert the innocent owner defense.9 6 The case was remanded to the dis-
trict court so it could be determined if she was in fact an innocent
owner.
97
The facts of this case seem to raise straightforward issues; however,
in rendering its decision, the United States Supreme Court was forced to
decide a number of sub-issues that had the potential to dramatically alter
the forfeiture scheme in its application and effectiveness. One of the
most basic issues was how the term "owner" was to be defined. Another
important issue was to determine what role the relation-back theory
should play in the overall statutory scheme. The final, and most difficult,
issue was to resolve the inherent conflict between sections 881(a)(6) and
881(h). These issues were closely related as evidenced by the difficulty
the lower courts had in applying the provisions simultaneously. The fol-
lowing sections of this Comment attempt to frame these issues in their
historical context in an effort to understand their significance in the cur-
rent forfeiture scheme.
94. The district court issued the order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988), which pro-
vides that:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeal-
able under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals
which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discre-
tion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within
ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, [t]hat application for an ap-
peal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Id.
95. Buena Vista, 937 F.2d at 100.
96. Id. at 101-02.
97. Id. at 103.
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A. Defining Who Is an "Owner"
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.98 considered who should be an
owner under the forfeiture statute. It is logical that non-owners should
not be allowed to assert a defense intended for owners. Substantial evi-
dence suggests that the term "owner" should be construed in a broad
sense to include both bona fide purchasers for value and individuals who
came into possession through other means.
The statute's language clearly indicates that "owner" is intended to
encompass more than bona fide purchasers for value. If a narrow con-
struction was desired, Congress could have expressly stated that only
bona fide purchasers were protected, as it did in the criminal forfeiture
statute.99 In addition, the statute makes no explicit reference to the
means by which property is procured, which leads to the logical conclu-
sion that Congress was not concerned with the issue. The Joint Explana-
tory Statement' 00 that accompanied the amendment of section 881(a)(6)
outlined congressional intent with respect to the definition by stating
that" 'owner' should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a
recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized."' 1 This
statement indicates that Congress did not intend to limit the construction
in any way. The courts have followed congressional intent by construing
owner with a broad- interpretation. 02
98. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
99. Section 853(c) provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this sec-
tion. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the
defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be
ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing
pursuant to subsection (n) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property
who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property
was subject to forfeiture under this section.
21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
100. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON TITLES II & III, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124
CONG. REc. 34,670 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518.
101. Id. at 34,672, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9522.
102. See, e.g., United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989) (co-tenant
considered owner); United States v. $10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1987)
(attorney considered owner); In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987) (mortgagee
considered owner). See also United States v. One 1987 Volkswagen Jetta, 760 F. Supp. 772,
775 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (citation omitted) (defining ownership as "having a possessory interest
in the res, with its attendant characteristics of dominion and control").
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B. The Relation-Back Doctrine
The relation-back doctrine is a well-established rule in our legal sys-
tem that vests ownership of statutorily forfeitable property in the gov-
ernment at the precise moment of the commission of the offense giving
rise to the forfeiture. Its origins can be traced to the first civil forfeitures
in our nation's history.10 3 The Supreme Court outlined the basic doc-
trine in its 1818 opinion of Gelston v. Hoyt.1°4 The Court stated that
"the forfeiture must be deemed to attach at the moment of the commis-
sion of the offence, and, consequently, from that moment, the title of the
plaintiff would be completely devested, so that he could maintain no ac-
tion for the subsequent seizure.' 0
5
The doctrine was consistently applied as an essential element in civil
forfeiture cases because the owners had no recourse once the offense
was committed. The Court offered an excellent summation of the doc-
trine and its role in civil forfeiture in Caldwell v. United States:1
0 6
In the first, the forfeiture is, the statutory transfer of right to the
goods at the time the offence is committed. If this was not so, the
transgressor, against whom, of course, the penalty is directed,
would often escape punishment, and triumph in the cleverness of
his contrivance, by which he has violated the law. The title of the
United States to the goods forfeited, is not consummated until
after judicial condemnation; but the right to them relates back-
wards to the time the offence was committed, so as to avoid all
intermediate sales of them between the commission of the offence
and condemnation. 10 7
These early civil forfeiture cases assist in understanding the relation-
back doctrine; however, more importantly, they place the doctrine in its
proper context as an essential element to any forfeiture scheme. Its ne-
cessity becomes apparent when practical considerations are realized. If
property did not vest in the government at the time the offense was com-
mitted, there would be ample opportunity for property to be concealed,
which would defeat the entire purpose of an in rem proceeding.
The doctrine was reiterated in United States v. Stowell, 08 where the
Court explained, "[T]he forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the
commission of the act; the right to the property then vests in the United
103. See United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 405-06 (1814).
104. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
105. Id. at 311.
106. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 366 (1850).
107. Id. at 381-82.
108. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
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States, although their title is not perfected until judicial condemna-
tion." 10 9 The cases above are only a sampling of the many cases that
have restated this well-established doctrine.110 The doctrine was eventu-
ally codified"' and incorporated into both the criminal and civil forfei-
ture statutory schemes." 2
C. Attempting to Reconcile Sections 881(a) (6) and 881(h)
The amendments to the civil forfeiture statute have resulted in a
scheme that is more comprehensive and more effective in fulfilling the
statute's intended purposes. Unfortunately, however, the amendments
have also developed a scheme of inherent inconsistency that threatens to
keep the statute and the courts in turmoil until it is successfully resolved.
The conflict exists between the innocent owner defense of section
881(a)(6) and the relation-back provision of section 881(h). The basic
issue is which of these two subsections should be applied first.
If the innocent owner defense of section 881(a)(6) is applied first, it
negates section 881(h), which vests tifle in the United States government
upon commission of the offense.1 3 This application of the statute would
allow owners to stay in possession while they are asserting the defense
and would offer them the opportunity to conceal the property that was
subject to forfeiture. There would be no limit to the transactions that
could take place if the offender attempts to hide the bounty of the illegal
activity. The effectiveness of section 881(h) and the common-law doc-
trine upon which it is based would be nullified.
Conversely, if section 881(h) is applied first, a new range of difficul-
ties ensues because the innocent owner defense of section 881(a)(6) is
diminished to a nonfactor. The situation would be particularly problem-
atic for individuals acquiring the property after the -offense has been
committed because they have acquired property to which the govern-
ment holds title and which they have never owned. Thus, it would be an
attempt to assert an innocent owner defense on property to which the
government has always held good title.
109. Id at 16-17.
110. For additional cases interpreting the relation back doctrine, see Thacher's Distilled
Spirits, 103 U.S. 679 (1880); Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44 (1871); United
States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814); United States v. Grundy &
Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 338 (1806).
111. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(f), 98 Stat. 1837, 2051 (1984).
112. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
113. It should be noted that title vests in the United States at the time of the commission
of the offense, but is not perfected until judicial condemnation is decreed.
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This inherent conflict between the statutory provisions has created
great difficulties for courts attempting to apply the statute. These courts
have been unable to compromise in their application and have gone to
opposing extremes described above.
In re One 1985 Nissan 14 addressed section 881(a)(6) and its innocent
owner defense. In Nissan, the police discovered the bodies of Dennis
White, a drug trafficker, and his daughter in White's house.115 They ap-
parently had been the victims of murder.116 While in the house, the po-
lice discovered "cash, checks, jewelry and electronic equipment." 17 The
government began a forfeiture action against the property,"" alleging
that it was drug proceeds and thus subject to forfeiture under section
881(a)(6). 1 9 Summary judgment was granted to the government by the
district court, which upheld the forfeiture.2 0 The representative of
White's estate claimed that White's heirs should be able to assert the
innocent owner defense.' This contention was rejected by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which relied heavily on
the relation-back doctrine in making its decision.'2 The court
explained:
[N]o third party can acquire a legally valid interest in the property
forfeited from anyone other than the government after the illegal
act takes place. The fair implication of this language is that unless
a claimant has a claim to the property forfeited which existed
prior to the time the acts take place which bring on forfeiture,
then the innocent owner provision of the statute has no
application.'23
The court's decision in Nissan illustrates the significance of the order in
which the statutory provisions are applied and how the order can lead to
drastic and harsh results. The court acknowledged these results, but in-
sisted that the relation-back doctrine be given precedence over the inno-
cent owner's rights.' 24
114. 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989).
115. Id. at 1318.
116. Id
117. Id
118. The property involved had a value of over $1.5 million as it included: "$1,002,219.48
in cash, $37,086 in checks, two pieces of real estate, 42 pieces of jewelry, 30 pieces of electronic
equipment, and five automobiles." Id
119. Id
120. United States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. 232, 250 (D. Md. 1987).
121. Nissan, 889 F.2d at 1319.
122. Id at 1321.
123. Id at 1320 (emphasis omitted).
124. Id. at 1320-21.
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The same issue was presented to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit and that court reached opposite results. In Eggles-
ton v. Colorado,'25 the court held that the innocent owner defense could
be asserted by owners who obtained title to the property after the illegal
act had been committed. One fact that differentiates Eggleston from
other section 881(a)(6) cases is that the entities attempting to assert the
defense in Eggleston were government agencies.126 The court held that
the relation-back doctrine did apply and that it cut off ownership at the
time the offense was committed; however, the court indicated that the
doctrine should be applied "subject to the so-called innocent owners ex-
ception in section 881(a)(6).' ' 7 Although the court's decision in Eggles-
ton is couched in terms of a middle of the road approach to applying the
conflicting provisions, the latent effect is still that section 881(h) is ren-
dered void.
The Third Circuit reiterated and strengthened the language of Eg-
gleston in Buena Vista. The court held that the innocent owner provision
of section 881(a)(6) must be applied prior to the application of section
881(h) because to apply the provisions in reverse order "would essen-
tially serve to emasculate the innocent owner defense.""z The court
made no attempt to find a position that would allow both statutes to
retain complete effectiveness, but rather relied on statutory construction
in holding that section 881(a)(6) should be applied first.129 The court
stated:
Logically then one must first ascertain whether the property at
issue is not forfeitable because of an innocent owner defense
before applying section 881(h). If the property is exempted from
forfeiture pursuant to an innocent owner defense and therefore is
125. 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Colorado Dept. of Revenue v.
United States, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
126. In this case, the "police seized twelve one-ounce gold bars and approximately $1.5
million in cash," which were the "proceeds of illegal drug transactions." Id. at 243. After the
seizure, a number of parties attempted to establish priority for their claims. Id. The Colorado
Department of Revenue, the IRS, and the DEA were the most pertinent to the action. Id. at
243-44. The Colorado Department of Revenue attempted to establish itself as an innocent
owner, but the court rejected this contention and allowed the DEA to seize the assets. Id. at
247-48.
127. Id. at 247.
128. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
1126 (1993).
129. The court stated, "we must read the plain language of the statute as Congress must
have intended it by the words and structure it carefully chose." Id.
[Vol. 77:856
CIVIL FORFEITURE AND DRUG PROCEEDS
not forfeitable property under subsection (a), then section 881(h)
does not apply to such property that is not subject to forfeiture.130
The Third Circuit's reliance on statutory construction seemed to be an
effective solution to the conflicting statutory provisions, yet the final ef-
fect was the same to the extent that section 881(h) was rendered ineffec-
tive. This was not Congress's intent.
These cases illustrate the difficulty encountered by the courts in rec-
onciling the two statutory provisions. Each court interpreted the stat-
utes in a slightly different way, but the final effect in each case was that
either section 881(a)(6) or section 881(h) was at least partially disabled.
This was the historical and legislative context in which the Supreme
Court was presented with Buena Vista. With such a backdrop, a compro-
mise decision was impossible.
V. Tim SuPREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion in United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Avenue"'1 provides an excellent illustration of the inherent difficul-
ties involved in applying the current federal forfeiture scheme. The plu-
rality opinion was written by Justice Stevens and was joined by Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring
opinion and was joined by Justice Thomas. In dissent, Justice Kennedy
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
A. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality concluded that the innocent owner exception applied to
innocent donees as well as to bona fide purchasers for value." 2 To sup-
port this broad interpretation, the Court relied solely on statutory lan-
guage. The Court stated, "The term 'owner' is used three times and each
time it is unqualified. Such language is sufficiently unambiguous to fore-
close any contention that it applies only to bona fide purchasets.' ' 3 The
Court summarized the effects of its ruling on the present case by stating
that "[u]nder the terms of the statute, her status would be precisely the
same if, instead of having received a gift of $240,000 from Brenna, she
had sold him a house for that price and used the proceeds to buy the
property at issue.""
130. 1&
131. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
132. Id. at 1134 (plurality opinion).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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After establishing a broad definition of the term "owner," the plural-
ity addressed the problem of applying the innocent owner provision of
section 881(a)(6) in conjunction with the relation-back provision of sec-
tion 881(h). The Court asserted that the relation-back provision cannot
be applied until forfeiture has been decreed and that forfeiture cannot
be rightfully decreed until the owner has had an opportunity to prove his
or her innocence under the innocent owner provision. The plurality ex-
pressly rejected the contention that the Government would have good
title to the property at any point before forfeiture had been decreed by
pointing out that if such a construction were implemented, it "would ef-
fectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imagina-
ble case in which proceeds could be forfeited."'1 35
The plurality noted that the relation-back provision found in section
881(h) was not law in 1982136 when the respondent acquired the prop-
erty. As a result, the Court analyzed the relation-back theory under
common law.13 7 The common law vested title in the government from
the time illegal acts occurred but was not "self-executing.' 1 38 The Court
noted that the requirement that forfeiture be decreed was not a new
concept, but rather was one that was well established in the common
law. The end result of the Court's application of the relation-back the-
ory was that "[u]ntil the Government does win such a judgment,...
someone else owns the property."'139 It is then up to the person who
owns the property to raise any defense to the forfeiture they may have
before its condemnation.
The plurality discussed the statutory relation-back provision in an ef-
fort to clarify how it should be applied when proceeds are the target of
the forfeiture.140 Section 881(h) states, "All right, title, and interest in
property described in subsection (a) shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section."'' The
135. Id. at 1135.
136. Section 881(h) was implemented in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(f), 98 Stat. 1837,
2051 (1984) (current version at 21 U.S.C. 881(h) (1988)).
137. The plurality proceeds somewhat reluctantly under the common law theory as it
states that "[b]ecause we are not aware of any common-law precedent for treating proceeds
traceable to an unlawful exchange as a fictional wrongdoer subject to forfeiture, it is not en-
tirely clear that the common-law relation back doctrine is applicable." Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct.
at 1135.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1136.
140. Id. at 1136. The Court also noted that the codification of the relation back doctrine
did not disturb the rights of either the government or the innocent owners but rather left them
in the same state as before the provision's enactment. Id. at 1137.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
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Court rejected the government's contention that because proceeds were
part of the" 'property described in subsection (a),' " they should be pre-
vented "from becoming the property of anyone other than the United
States." 42 The Court reasoned that the proceeds were part of the
"property described in subsection (a)," but were exempt from forfeiture
because they fall under the exception for those without knowledge of the
tainted proceeds. By using such reasoning, the Court clearly established
that the innocent owner determination must be made before the rela-
tion-back doctrine could even be considered.
The plurality concluded by examining two peripheral issues that were
related to the case, but which the Court felt "need not be decided." 143
First, the Court addressed the issue of knowledge and posed the question
of when the transferee must have knowledge to qualify as an innocent
owner under the statute. After a short discussion of the various posi-
tions, 144 the plurality stated that "we need not resolve this issue in this
case; respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact
that she had no knowledge of the alleged source of Brenna's gift in 1982,
when she received it."' 45 The final issue discussed by the plurality was
the definition of the term "proceeds" as used in the statute, and just as
with the knowledge issue, the Court offered no opinion.
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, disagreeing with the plural-
ity on two points. First, he claimed that the plurality's construction of
the statutory relation-back provision was incorrect because the phrase,
"property described in subsection (a)" 46 was construed "as not encom-
passing any property that is protected from forfeiture by the 'innocent
owner' provision of § 881(a)(6)."' 47 Justice Scalia noted the plurality's
142. Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1136 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 1137.
144. The Court explained:
The Government has argued that the Court of Appeals' construction of the statute
is highly implausible because it would enable a transferee of the proceeds of an illegal
exchange to qualify as an innocent owner if she was unaware of the illegal transaction
when it occurred but learned about it before she accepted the forfeitable proceeds.
Respondent disputes this reading of the statute and argues that both legislative history
and common sense suggest that the transferee's lack of knowledge must be established
as of the time the proceeds at issue are transferred.
Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 1137-38.
146. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
147. Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia summed up his
disagreement with the plurality as follows, "I do not see how the plurality can, solely by focus-
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reasoning that "since, therefore, the application of (a)(6) must be deter-
mined before (h) can be fully applied, respondent must be considered an
'owner' under that provision-just as she would have been considered
an 'owner' (prior to decree of forfeiture) at common law."'1 He further
explained his disagreement with the plurality's reading of the statute by
stating, "The fact that application of (a)(6) must be determined before
(h) can be fully applied simply does not establish that the word 'owner'
in (a)(6) must be deemed to include (as it would at common law) anyone
who held title prior to the actual decree of forfeiture. To assume that is
simply to beg the question." '149 Instead of the plurality's construction,
Justice Scalia argued that section 881(h) "covers 'all property described
in subsection (a),' including property so described that is nonetheless
exempted from forfeiture because of the innocent owner defense."'150
He construed the relation-back provision to vest title in the Government
from the date forfeiture is decreed, "effective as of commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture."' 5 Under such a theory, "the person holding
legal title is genuinely the 'owner' at the time (prior to the decree of
forfeiture) that the court applies § 881(a)(6)'s innocent-owner provi-
sion.' 52 Title would vest in the government only "if forfeiture is
decreed."' 53
According to Scalia, the interpretation of section 881(h) described
above "is the only one that makes sense within the structure of the statu-
tory forfeiture procedures.' ' 4 Under the established procedures, 55 the
government does not gain title to the property until a judicial proceeding
is held and forfeiture is decreed. He pointed out that "[i]f, however,
ing on the phrase 'property described in subsection (a),' establish that the word 'owner' in
subsection (a) includes persons holding title after the forfeiture-producing offense." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Id. at 1139 (citation omitted). He explained that the Government was in agreement
with him on this construction, but also pointed out that such a construction directly conflicts
with the Government's contention that title to the property vests immediately in the United
States upon the commission of the offense. He noted that "if both were true no one would be
protected under the plain language of the innocent-owner provision." I& He also pointed out
that under the reasoning above, "the Government is forced to argue that the word 'owner' in
§ 881(a)(6) should be interpreted to mean 'former owner.'" Id. (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 1140.
152. Id.
153. Id (emphasis omitted).
154. Id.
155. Justice Scalia noted that "[s]ubsection 881(d) provides that forfeitures under § 881
are governed by the procedures applicable to 'summary and judicial forfeiture, and condem-
nation of property for violation of the customs laws,' set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq." Id.
at 1140.
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legal title to the property actually vested in the United States at the time
of the illegal act, judicial forfeiture proceedings would never be 'neces-
sary.' ,,156 To contrast procedures that require a judicially administered
forfeiture procedure, Justice Scalia referred to the customs forfeiture
provisions, where "the United States can, in certain limited circum-
stances, obtain title to property by an executive declaration of
forfeiture."'15 7
Justice Scalia's second disagreement was that the Court claimed the
respondent had "assumed the burden of proving that 'she had no knowl-
edge of the alleged source of Brenna's gift in 1982 when she received
it.' 5158 He asserted that no basis for this conclusion existed because the
issue was "not fairly included within the question on which the Court
granted certiorari."'51 9
Justice Scalia addressed this issue by asserting that it "was not a sepa-
rate issue in the case, but arose indirectly, by way of argumentation on
the relation-back point.' 160 He summarized his opinion regarding the
issue by parenthetically stating:
I do not find inconceivable the possibility that post-illegal-act
transferees with post-illegal-act knowledge of the earlier illegality
are provided a defense against forfeiture. The Government
would still be entitled to the property held by the drug dealer and
by close friends and relatives who are unable to meet their bur-
den of proof as to ignorance of the illegal act when it occurred.' 6 '
Justice Scalia's comments regarding this final issue, like those of the plu-
rality, seem to cast doubt upon this important question.
C. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy shifted the focus of the discussion
from what he called the "wrong issue" to "the threshold and dispositive
156. Id.
157. I& 19 U.S.C. § 1609(b) (1988) states in pertinent part:
[A] declaration of forfeiture... shall have the same force and effect as a final decree
and order of forfeiture in a judicial forfeiture proceeding in a district court of the
United States. Title shall be deemed to vest in the United States... from the date of
the act for which the forfeiture was incurred.
Id.
158. Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1142 (citation omitted).
159. I& at 1142. He pointed out, parenthetically, that the proper question was "[w]hether
a person who receives a gift of money derived from drug trafficking and uses that money to
purchase real property is entitled to assert an 'innocent owner' defense in an action seeking
civil forfeiture of the real property." Id.
160. Id
161. I&
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inquiry... [of] whether the donee had any ownership rights that re-
quired a separate forfeiture, given that her title was defective and subject
to the Government's claim from the outset."162 He asked whether an
individual who holds an asset to which the Government has superior title
should be able to transfer title to another person for no value and defeat
the Government's claim.
The dissent pointed out that when the dealer held what he certainly
knew to be proceeds of illegal drug transactions, "it was subject to forfei-
ture and to the claim of the United States, which had a superior interest
in the property." '163 Justice Kennedy then asserted that the defective ti-
tle cannot be cured by any type of transfer, except for that to a bona fide
purchaser for value at which point title "would become unassailable in
the purchaser, subject to any heightened rules of innocence the Govern-
ment might lawfully impose under the forfeiture laws." 64 The dissent
then discussed the well-established concept of voidable title, which
would aid in deciding whether property that was once subject to forfei-
ture retained this status after subsequent transfers. 65 After applying the
rules of voidable title, it became apparent that the bona fide purchaser
for value gained good title to the property,' 66 while the donee of drug
trafficking proceeds held voidable title because she could not gain supe-
rior title to that held by the donor. 67
162. Id. at 1143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The dissent explained:
The primary rules of voidable title are manageable and few in number. The first is that
one who purchases property in good faith and for value from the holder of voidable
title obtains good title. The second rule, reciprocal to the first, is that one who acquires
property from a holder of voidable title other than by a good faith purchase for value
obtains nothing beyond what the transferor held. The third rule is that a transferee
who acquires property from a good faith purchaser for value or. one of his lawful suc-
cessors obtains good title, even if the transferee did not pay value or act in good faith.
Id. at 1144.
166. The dissent explained the outcome in these situations in no uncertain terms as it
stated, "[T]he outcome, that one who had defective title can create good title in the new
holder by transfer for value, is not to be condemned as some bizarre surprise. This is not
alchemy. It is the common law." Id.
167. Justice Kennedy stated:
When the Government seeks forfeiture of an asset in the hands of a donee, its
forfeiture claim rests on defects in the title of the asset in the hands of the donor. The
transferee has no ownership superior to the transferor's which must be forfeited, so her
knowledge of the drug transaction, or lack thereof, is quite irrelevant, as are the arcane
questions concerning the textual application of § 881(a) to someone in a donee's
position.
I. at 1144-45.
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The dissent continued by discussing two practical difficulties created
by the plurality's construction of section 881. First, the purpose of the
statutory scheme was raised, and Justice Kennedy explained how the
plurality had undermined the statutory scheme in its decision. He ex-
plained that the Government must be able to circumvent donative trans-
fers if it is to effectively eliminate the economic incentive to traffic and
deal in illegal drugs."6 Second, the dissent raised the issue of timing and
knowledge and of how the plurality's decision seemed somewhat illogi-
cal from a practical perspective. 69
Finally, the dissent reiterated the notion that the wrong inquiry had
been undertaken by explaining that the plurality's opinion "rips out the
most effective enforcement provisions in all of the drug forfeiture
laws."' 7 o
V. IMPACr OF THE COURT'S DECISION
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave. revealed many of the inherent
conflicts and problems associated with the current civil forfeiture scheme
of 21 U.S.C. § 881. The Supreme Court was forced to decide between
competing schemes of statutory construction-neither of which would
completely solve the problems underlying the forfeiture statute.
The plurality chose the respondent's construction of the statute, hold-
ing that the broad meaning of the term "owner" should be used and that
the innocent owner defense should be asserted prior to application of
the relation-back provision. The effect of the Court's decision was to
allow the innocent donee in the case to retain the home that was
purchased with the illegally obtained funds. Under such a construction,
drug dealers and traffickers will be able to defeat the forfeiture of drug
proceeds by giving them to "innocent" third parties and allowing them
to assert the innocent owner defense. The same effect occurs under the
concurring opinion's technical reading of the statutory provisions.
The dissent refocused the entire inquiry from the "wrong issue" to a
completely different question. 7 ' The effect of this approach was the ap-
plication of the relation-back doctrine before the owner was allowed to
present the innocent owner defense. This construction would have al-
lowed the government to be more effective in preventing drug dealers
168. Id at 1145.
169. Id at 1145-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1146.
171. U.S. v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1143 (1993).
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and traffickers from concealing assets by transferring them to innocent
third parties as gifts.
VI. POTENTL.. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
The Supreme Court's decision in Buena Vista and its accompanying
practical effects illustrate the need for legislative clarification so that this
statutory scheme can achieve its intended goals. The following sugges-
tions represent potential changes that would balance the compelling gov-
ernmental interest in controlling the proliferation of drugs in our society
against the interests of innocent property owners.
A. Adoption of Narrow Construction of "Owner"
One of the first changes that must be made is to replace the word
"owner" in section 881(a)(6) with "bona fide purchaser for value," as is
currently found in the criminal forfeiture equivalent to this section.
72
Congressional intent has clearly indicated that the term "owner" is to be
interpreted in the broad sense;173 however, this interpretation has led to
problems in determining how far this broad interpretation should ex-
tend. Changing the language will limit the scope of individuals invoking
the innocent owner defense. Under the current language, courts have
been forced to make artificial distinctions to determine who is an owner.
Such ambiguous language leaves the interested, non-owner parties in a
state of uncertainty and will inhibit effective application of the statute.
Congress must adopt the narrow "bona fide purchasers for value" lan-
guage or the all-inclusive "interested party" language because the pres-
ent language only adds to the confusion of who may assert the defense.
The narrow language will make it more difficult for offenders to dis-
tribute their illegal proceeds as gifts to innocent individuals with the in-
tended purpose of circumventing forfeiture. It will also prevent donees
from benefitting from the fruits of illegal activities.
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.174 presents an excellent example
of why the provision must be modified to include only bona fide pur-
chasers for value. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, Ms.
Goodwin will be allowed to assert the defense as an "innocent owner,"
and thus, the proceeds of Mr. Brenna's illegal activity will not be tainted.
When Mr. Brenna is released from prison, he will be able to live in the
172. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)(1988).
173. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. The Court reiterated this interpreta-
tion in Buena Vista. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
174. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
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house and continue to reap the fruits of his illegal activity. This is pre-
cisely what the statute sought to prevent. It also must be acknowledged
that Mr. Brenna chose Ms. Goodwin to be the recipient of the gift. A
donee situation is different than a situation involving a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, who enters into an arm's length transaction for the
purchase of property. To include innocent donees within the defense
would place offenders, like Mr. Brenna, in a position to dictate how the
illegally obtained property should be distributed.
B. Application of Section 881(h) Before Section 881(a)(6)
It is apparent that both statutory provisions cannot be applied simul-
taneously because one of the provisions will lose its effectiveness. In
deciding which of the two provisions should predominate, it is necessary
to consider congressional intent and the ultimate consequences of the
decision.
Section 881(h) should be allowed to take precedence so that the en-
tire statutory scheme can retain its effectiveness. If this section were to
be rendered invalid in situations in which an innocent owner defense was
being asserted, the owner would be able to retain possession and conceal
assets that are subject to forfeiture. This opportunity would deprive the
entire statutory scheme of its effect.
This interpretation comports with the long history of civil forfeiture
and fulfills its purpose.175 The action is undertaken against the property
because the property has been found to be culpable in some way. This
culpability is separate and distinct from any pending criminal action
against the offender, which is the reason that no conviction is required
for the seizure to take place. The immediacy with which a civil forfeiture
action can proceed is one of its most important advantages. To prevent
the immediate seizure and divestiture of title would disable one of civil
forfeiture's most important features.
The application of the relation-back doctrine of section 881(h) prior
to section 881(a)(6) still leaves the innocent owner defense of section
881(a)(6) somewhat disabled. Any harsh results of this application of
the statutory provisions are somewhat mitigated by the fact that not all
innocent owners would be left without the ability to assert the section
881(a)(6) defense. The innocent owner defense would only be invalid
with respect to property acquired after the illegal act has occurred.
Owners who held title to the property at the time of the illegal act would
175. See supra notes 9-63 and accompanying text.
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still be able to assert the defense because they held good title until the
point at which the illegal act was undertaken. This distinction is critical
because it delineates a comparatively small class of interested parties
who will be left without the opportunity to assert the innocent owner
defense of section 881(a)(6).
The decision of what should be done to accommodate the interests of
individuals who are left without the ability to assert the innocent owner
defense can be made by a simple balancing of the equities. Their inter-
ests must be balanced against the compelling societal interest of dealing
effectively with the drug problem. This class of innocent owners does
need protection, but it seems that the cost of their protection is substan-
tially outweighed by the benefits that the statutory scheme provides to
society. If drug traffickers have the opportunity to conceal their assets as
a result of the undue time given to them under the statute, then the
purpose of civil forfeiture is defeated. However, these owners should
not be left completely without protection or recourse once their property
has been seized. They should still be able to pursue the administrative
remedies available under section 881(d).
The concept of providing administrative remedies for innocent own-
ers whose property has been subjected to forfeiture is not a new or novel
idea. "Since 1790 the Federal Government has applied the ameliorative
policy... of providing administrative remissions and mitigations of stat-
utory forfeitures in most cases where the violations are incurred 'without
willful negligence' or an intent to commit the offense."'176 Section
881(d) 177 authorizes the Attorney General to remit or mitigate civil for-
feitures of drug-related assets by using the procedures outlined for cus-
176. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 n.27 (1974) (cita-
tion omitted).
177. Section 881(d) provides:
The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and
condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such
property or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission or mitigation of such
forfeitures; and the compromise of claims shall apply to seizures and forfeitures in-
curred, or alleged to have been incurred, under any of the provisions of this title, inso-
far as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof; except that such
duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with respect to the
seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs laws shall be performed with re-
spect to seizures and forfeitures of property under this title by such officers, agents, or
other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney
General, except that such duties arise from seizures and forfeitures effected by any
customs officer.
21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988).
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toms offenses under 19 U.S.C. § 1618.178 The administrative procedure
can occur simultaneously with a judicial action under the statute's inno-
cent owners defense, or it can be used as a replacement for the judicial
procedure. In addition, the procedure can be invoked before or after the
judgment of forfeiture has been entered. The statute offers this adminis-
trative alternative to "any person interested" in the property that has
been seized. The statute's broad language encompasses more parties
than the innocent owner defenses contained in section 881(a). This
broad construction helps fill the gaps in the innocent owner defense
framework.
The regulations enacted to effectuate section 1618179 delegate the im-
plementation duties to the Director of the Asset Forfeiture Office of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.180 These regulations of-
fer a complete framework of criteria to be used by the Attorney General
in rendering decisions under the administrative alternative. The criteria
governing proceedings regarding remission provide:
(b) The Determining Official shall not remit a forfeiture un-
less the petitioner establishes:
(1) That petitioner has a valid, good faith interest in the
seized property as owner or otherwise; and
(2) That petitioner had no knowledge that the property in
which petitioner claims an interest was or would be involved in
any violation of the law; and
178. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988) provides:
Whenever, any person interested in any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or
baggage seized under the provisions of this act, or who has incurred, or is alleged to
have incurred, any fine or penalty thereunder, files with the Secretary of the Treasury if
under the customs laws, and with the Commandant of the Coast Guard or the Commis-
sioner of Customs, as the case may be, if under the navigation laws, before the sale of
such vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage a petition for the remission or
mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Com-
mandant of the Coast Guard, or the Commissioner of Customs, if he finds that such
fine, penalty, or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any inten-
tion on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds
the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation
of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, may remit or mitigate the same upon such terms and
conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance of any prosecution
relating thereto. In order to enable him to ascertain the facts, the Secretary of the
Treasury may issue a commission to any customs officer to take testimony upon such
petition: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to deprive any person
of an award of compensation made before the filing of such petition.
19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988).
179. Remission or Mitigation of Civil Forfeitures, 28 C.F.R. 9 9 (1992).
180. 28 C.F.R. § 9.3(c).
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(3) That petitioner had no knowledge of the particular viola-
tion which subjected the property to seizure and forfeiture; and
(4) That petitioner had no knowledge that the user of the
property had any record for violating laws of the U.S. or of any
State for a related crime; and
(5) That petitioner had taken all reasonable steps to prevent
the illegal use of the property.181
In addition to establishing the criteria for remission, the regulations also
provide -the criteria for mitigation.'8s Remission and mitigation offer an
alternative for individuals who do not fall within the boundaries of the
statutorily prescribed innocent owner defense under section 881(a), but
who have an interest in the seized property. The regulations seem to be
particularly concerned with protecting the interests of business and fi-
nancial institutions; special provisions protect general creditors,"s
lienholders,' 84 lessors,1 85 and voluntary bailors.186 These protections en-
sure that forfeitures do not interfere with the normal course of business
activity. Finally, the regulations provide for the denial of remission and
mitigation in situations in which it appears that a straw purchase transac-
tion designed to avoid forfeiture has occurred."s
Administrative remedies would appear to offer a remedy to inter-
ested parties who do not fall within any of the specified innocent owner
defenses of section 881(a). The language used in the regulation criteria
appears to utilize the dictum of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co. '8  By using the Supreme Court's comments189 to craft the regula-
181. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(b).
182. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(c) outlines the general criteria of when mitigation should be invoked
as it provides in pertinent part:
This authority may be exercised in those cases where the petitioner has not met the
minimum conditions precedent to remission but where there are present other extenu-
ating circumstances indicating that some relief should be granted to avoid extreme
hardship. Mitigation may also be granted where the minimum standards for remission
have been satisfied but the overall circumstances are such that, in the opinion of the
determining official, complete relief is not warranted. Mitigation shall take the form of
a money penalty imposed upon the petitioner in addition to any other sums chargeable
as a condition to remission.
Id.
183. 28 C.F.R. § 9.6(a).
184. 28 C.F.R. § 9.7(b).
185. 28 C.F.R. 9.6(d).
186. 28 C.F.R. § 9.6(e).
187. 28 C.F.R. § 9.6(f).
188. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
189. In Calero-Toledo, the Court stated that "it would be difficult to reject the constitu-
tional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him
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tions, innocent owners likely will not be deprived of their Due Process
rights because they would have the administrative remedies available to
them. The only problem with this analysis is that the administrative rem-
edy is available only through the same branch of the government that is
charged with initially bringing the forfeiture actions. Such a system of-
fends the separation of powers that is one of the most fundamental ide-
als of our system of justice.
C. Judicially Administered Equitable Hearing
The final change that must be made to the statutory scheme of sec-
tion 881 is to insert a provision that will provide for remission of inno-
cent owner property on an equitable basis using a member of the judicial
branch as the decision maker. In this way, the inherent problems of the
"fox guarding the hen house" could be avoided. The standards used
could be the same standards presently employed through the administra-
tive remedy; it has already been established that the criteria enumerated
in the present administrative regulations meet the constitutional require-
ments discussed by the Court in Calero-Toledo.1 90 Such an additional
provision would not mean that the present administrative remedies
would be abolished. These remedies should remain available to those
institutions that invoke the defense during the normal course of busi-
ness. This new remedy would be available to interested individuals who
clearly cannot invoke any of the other innocent owner provisions. The
new provision would assure that innocent owners are allowed to set
forth their equitable claims to an impartial, disinterested third party.
VII. CONCLUSION
Civil forfeiture statutes were first enacted to address crimes that were
motivated by profit and which could best be punished by treating the
profit and the property used in implementing the illegal act as wrongdo-
ers. Congress has employed this tool as an effective weapon to fight the
scourge of illicit drugs in our society; however, Congress has tempered
the statute by trying to protect innocent owners from having their prop-
without his privity or consent." Id. at 689 (footnotes omitted). 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(b)(3) provides
for remission where "petitioner had no knowledge of the particular violation." IL In addi-
tion, in Calero-Toledo the Court stated that a constitutional claim might be upheld where an
owner could prove that "he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(b)(5) pro-
vides for remission where "petitioner had taken all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use
of the property." Id.
190. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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erty seized. This attempt at balancing both of these highly regarded so-
cial interests has proven frustrating for the courts and those involved in
these cases.
The changes this Comment has suggested are an attempt at maintain-
ing the effectiveness of the statute while still providing effective solutions
for those innocent owners whose property has become subject to forfei-
ture. These changes, like any effective solution, will require the coopera-
tion of both Congress and the Supreme Court. If this cooperation can be
secured, an effective balance will be achieved and congressional intent
can finally be realized. If the changes outlined above were placed into
effect, Ms. Goodwin would not be able to assert the innocent owner de-
fense under section 881(a)(6) because she was not a bona fide purchaser
for value. She would, however, be able to present her case to an impar-
tial judicial official, and she vould not have to plead with the same
branch that brought the forfeiture action originally.
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